By Gary Armida
Last week, we examined the disaster that is JP Ricciardi and the Toronto Blue Jays. This week, we’ll examine what a successful general manager does, even if he follows the same principles that Ricciardi is said to be following. When looking through the Moneyball type GMs in baseball today, it was important to pick someone who has the same type of budget and plays similar competition. The task was easy because there is one general manager in the game that resides in Ricciardi’s backyard. Theo Epstein, GM of the Boston Red Sox, is the exemplar of a good general manager. He follows a more statistic-oriented approach, but unlike his colleague in Toronto, he has shown the ability to adapt. It is that very ability along with keen player evaluation, and the ability to evaluate the success of your program that makes Theo Epstein the top general manager in the game.
In November of 2002, the Boston Red Sox made the controversial decision to hire a 30 year old as their general manager. Epstein would not be alone as the Red Sox also hired the legendary stats guru, Bill James as an advisor. Epstein inherited an aging roster with many holes to fill. He did have a decent starting rotation with Pedro Martinez, Derek Lowe, and Tim Wakefield as a solid nucleus. It was an interesting thing for the baseball world to watch Epstein execute a plan that would, in two years team, yield a long awaited World Series title.
Good GM Quality #1: Choose your Free Agents Wisely
When looking at Ricciardi, we saw that he plucked many veterans off the free agent wire like Matt Stairs, Frank Thomas, and Shannon Stewart. When Epstein began remaking the Red Sox, he looked at younger, undervalued talent still entering their prime, the real Moneyball way of acquiring free agents. In his first free agent class, he signed Jeremy Giambi (a bust), Bill Mueller (an underappreciated hitter with a high OBP), Kevin Millar, and a young, underperforming hitter with good on base skills in David Ortiz. The Ortiz signing went un-noticed and when the Sox broke camp it was Jeremy Giambi who received the starting nod at first base.
That first year obviously set the tone for the future of the Red Sox as Ortiz morphed into “Big Papi” and the Sox offense took off. Epstein would follow a similar pattern when bringing in free agents, often looking for the undervalued player. However, as the Sox had more success the budget grew. Epstein could afford to bring in a higher quality free agent, much like Ricciardi was able to in Toronto with its budget increase. So, instead of investing in oft-injured pitchers or signing an aging veteran, Epstein finds players who suit the system or fill a need. Even when he does bring in a veteran, he makes sure there is still production like when he brought in Curt Schilling for the 2004 season. Schilling was still productive at 37 years old, perhaps from not throwing as many innings during his 20’s. Later he took a chance on JD Drew, a talented, yet underperforming player. Drew had a rough 2007, but he is one of the main reasons the Red Sox are in first place despite an injury to David Ortiz. When looking to add to the pitching staff, Epstein invested in Diasuke Matsuzaka instead of bidding on the likes of Gil Meche (or in the Yankees’ case, Kei Igawa). This season, instead of spending big money on a guy like Carlos Silva, Epstein signed Bartolo Colon as a low risk, high reward option. Before going on the disabled list, Colon has given the Red Sox quality innings and a 4-2 record. Sure, there have been clunkers like Giambi, but those mistakes have been few and far between. The keen player evaluation separates Epstein from the rest of the pack.
The moral of the story is quite simple. Every GM will have their fair share of poor signings. However, Epstein’s failures still are rooted in merit. Taking a chance on a younger player whose numbers suggest production is far better than signing a guy at the end of his career.
Good GM Quality #2: Trade Wisely
Epstein has not made many trades during his tenure. Of course, one can find the bad trades easily, such as sending Bronson Arroyo to the Reds for Wily Mo Pena. However, most of his trades have worked out to the benefit of the organization. Perhaps, Epstein’s signature trade was acquiring Josh Beckett, an ace that the Sox lacked with the departure of Pedro Martinez, in exchange for Hanley Ramirez. While Ramirez is a force in Florida, Epstein rationalized that getting the ace pitcher, in his prime, outweighed the contributions from a star shortstop. Add into the mix that he acquired Mike Lowell in the deal, a player with the perfect Fenway swing and it looks like a real winner for the Sox. It obviously worked out as Beckett finished second in the Cy Young Award voting in 2007 while Lowell had his best season of his career. They led the Red Sox to their second title in four seasons.
Another aspect of trading is knowing when not to deal. Epstein showed that he is a master at this during the previous off season. As any baseball fan knows, Johan Santana was available on the trade market. The early frontrunners were the Yankees. Epstein knew that the prospect of facing Santana would not be good, so he threw the Red Sox hats in the ring. Here comes the masterful part-he never, ever wanted him. The rumored packaged revolved around rookie sensation Jacoby Ellsbury and young pitchers Jon Lester and Clay Buchholz. Given that the Red Sox were an organization that prided itself on their farm system, it was shocking that Epstein would offer up the top prospects. When it looked as if the Red Sox were on the brink of acquiring Santana, they would magically pull back. This game went back and forth, all the while upping the Twins asking price from the Yankees. Finally, the Mets swooped in and acquired Santana. Now, Santana was out of the American League entirely and the Yankees were still left without a “put ‘em in the books” starter. Epstein did not seem to upset about failing to gain Santana. In the ultimate game of cat and mouse, Epstein did not overpay for someone just to keep him away from the opponent. Knowing when not to trade is just as valuable as making a good trade. Epstein does both well.
The moral here is also simple. Epstein does not make moves to appease fans. Perhaps that’s because he’s built equity by winning two titles. Many general managers will make a move or a trade to show that they are doing something, almost justifying their job. Epstein does not do this.
Good GM Quality #3: Develop the Farm
The Red Sox, Pre-Boy Wonder, were a veteran laden team with little help on the way. The Pawtucket Paw Sox were often quite barren. Epstein changed all that by drafting well and drafting useful, almost major league ready pitching. Now, a few years later, the Red Sox farm system is one of the more productive systems in the game. 2008 is a clear illustration of that with guys like Jon Lester, Clay Buchholz, and Justin Masterson all pitching well. Jacoby Ellsbury is setting Boston on fire with his tremendous speed.
It’s not just good enough to have a highly rated farm system. Teams like the Yankees and Indians have highly touted systems, yet the Red Sox seem to get immediate production from their prospects. Guys like Dustin Pedroia, Ellsbury, Lester, Buchholz, Masterson, and closer Jonathon Papelbon all have stepped into immediate success. While Yankees fans are still waiting on their first win from Ian Kennedy and Phil Hughes, the Sox keep marching pitcher after pitcher who help the organization win games. Ellsbury is already a star. Many clubs are forced to wait years before a player develops. The Sox don’t seem to have that problem. Credit has to be given to Epstein for drafting players who are nearly game ready.
Whether it is Epstein who deserves the credit or it’s just a matter of luck, the fact is that he is in charge of an organization that seems self sufficient. When a Sox player goes down, there seems to be one ready to come up and fill in. The GM has to get some credit for that.
Good GM Quality #4: Don’t Fall in Love with Your Players
This is a common mistake when it comes to successful teams. The Yankees are still suffering from this to a certain degree. This commonly happens when a team wins with veterans and then those veterans are re-signed to big money deals as almost a thank you for a title. Epstein was faced with that very problem after the 2004 season. Guys like Mueller, Martinez, Lowe, Damon, and Millar were all free agents soon after the first championship. Now, realize that Boston was in love with all of these guys because they were the first to win a title since 1918. Public opinion was strongly behind the notion to bring all of these “heroes” back. Epstein did not bring one of those players back. It brought about a ton of criticism, but he stuck with his plan. In came guys like Kevin Youkilis, Coco Crisp, and all of the aforementioned youngsters. The result? Well, as you know, there was another World Series title last season.
Having the conviction to make the unpopular move in the face of public scrutiny is a huge characteristic of a successful GM. Again, a team should never make a move to appease the fans. Epstein showed that if you make the right moves, eventually the fans respond positively.
Good GM Quality #5: Admit Your Mistakes and Adapt
This is one that many GMs are afraid to do. Why? Well, a mistake can cost a general manager his job. Epstein, however, does not back down from failure. One of his first moves as a GM was to endorse a plan by Bill James which structured the bullpen without a designated closer. James’ theory was based on sound statistics and logic stating the team’s best pitcher should be used in the most difficult circumstance. So, if a game’s turning point was in the 6th inning, the closer should come in there. While the logic is sound, the theory did not work because the players are human beings. The ninth inning, for one reason or another, needs someone who can handle the pressure that it brings, real or imagined. Once he saw the failure, Epstein reacted quickly by acquiring a real closer. During his World Series Championship seasons, Keith Foulke and Jonathan Papelbon, both excellent closers, stabilized the bullpen.
Epstein also shows that he can adapt the Moneyball strategies when needed. Unlike his Toronto counterpart, he recognizes the need quickly and adjusts. Under Epstein, the Red Sox usually finish at the bottom in the stolen base category. It is a principle in the Moneyball movement as it is viewed as a bad risk of losing an out. But, with Jacoby Ellsbury in the mix, along with other speedsters like Julio Lugo, the Red Sox are more of a running team this season. In fact, they rank second in the league in that category so far this season. Now, stat heads may shake their collective heads at the risk of attempting a stolen base. Well, if a team runs adroitly, that risk is minimized. Epstein (and James) recognizes that.
Conclusion
So, Mr. Ricciardi-that is how a general manager does his job. Epstein has a similar budget, but with the burden of more pressure. Theo Epstein is not perfect, no GM is. However, the majority of his moves have worked out quite well. The blueprint is there to follow, but few execute the plan better than Epstein. He has built the Red Sox into the best-run organization in baseball, from top to bottom. With a flourishing farm system and a group of talented players, both young and older, the Red Sox are in position for World Series titles for the next three or four seasons at the minimum. Not many GM’s can boast that fact.



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