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Hughes’ Bullpen Stint Should Be Permanent

From the manager to the beat writers, most people involved with the Yankees agree that the emergence of Phil Hughes in the 8^th inning has been one of the keys to the Yankees’ second half dominance. Hughes has become the most trusted “bridge to Mariano” since the days of Jeff Nelson and Mike Stanton in the late 1990s. He has dominated opponents with an unhittable fastball and a knee buckling curve, all with the poise of a grizzled vet. But this dominance will not translate to the starting rotation. Hughes’ must be left in the bullpen, not just because of his spectacular success, but because once back in the starting rotation he will wilt when he is unable to produce seven innings as good as his one in relief.

The Yankees and Brian Cashman were lambasted in the winter of 2007 when they refused to part with Phil Hughes (among others) for Johan Santana. The Yanks went on to miss the playoffs for the first time in 16 years and Santana put up monster numbers for the cross town Mets. Hughes was a major disappointment in 2008, going winless before getting hurt. But Hughes has been a giant since he was placed in the bullpen, which originally was simply a way to keep him on the major league roster. No one expected this kind of performance, and no one is talking about keeping him in the bullpen beyond this year.

They’re wrong.

W	L	ERA	WHIP	IP	K	BB	SV	SVO
4	1	1.41	0.87	44.2	55	12	3	5

With all of the hoopla surrounding those numbers, there has been little scrutiny of how his performance will translate into 100 pitches. Hughes’ achievements in relief have come due to a drastically different approach that he will find impossible to replicate as a starter.

By pitching less innings per appearance, Hughes is able to air it out consistently without saving his arm strength and velocity for later in the game. In 2007 and 2008 while pitching exclusively as a starter, Hughes’ average velocity on his fastball was 91 MPH. As a reliever in 2009 it is 95 MPH. This extra speed has allowed Hughes to miss his target or miss in the middle of the plate without getting hurt as much as he would if his fastball was a few miles slower. Looking at one of Hughes’ most recent appearances out of the pen, his pitches consistently appear in the middle of the strike zone. On September 13, 67% of Hughes’ pitches were strikes. The graph shows that many of those strikes were in the middle of the plate and very hittable, yet Hughes went untouched.

September 13:

Secondly, because he only faces a small amount of hitters per appearance, Hughes is able to eliminate some of his weaker pitches from his repertoire and throw what works best for him. His fastball, already dominant as a starter, has become the pitch that he relies on more than ever before. With the increased velocity described above, his fastball becomes lethal. This will not be the case if he returns to the mound as a starter and his often straight fastball will be eminently more hittable. In 2007 and 2008 Hughes threw his fastball 64% of the time. In 2009 he has thrown it 76% of the time. The pitches that suffered from the heavier reliance on his fastball and cutter is the change up and slider, which have disappeared from his pitch selection. His curve ball has been used almost as much as before, but he has always had varying results with his curve anyway. Hughes can get strikeouts with his curve, but he can’t throw it for a strike. As a reliever Hughes can focus on what he does best and eliminate the change and the slider from his catalog.

Actually, Hughes had already begun to eliminate pitches from his inventory as recently as this season. While starting in place of Chien Ming Wang on May 15, Hughes threw only two change ups and one slider to 70 fastballs and 18 curves. That game he was hit for 3 ERs while giving up 4 BB in 5 IP. What was the difference? The increased speed of the pitches and only seeing a handful of batters play a large role. Another reason Hughes has struggled as a starter is that he becomes more hittable as the game goes on. When he is on the mound for a lengthy outing, his secondary pitches and decreased velocity (compared to his shorter stints in relief) allows him to get hit as the game progresses. In his career Hughes’ batting average against (BAA) goes from .189 the first time around to .321 when the hitters see him for a second time. Similarly, he allows a .190 BAA for the first 25 pitches of a game. That increases to .259 for the next 25 pitches, and to .303 for the next 25.

Many of these numbers are a bit unfair to Hughes, as they are from his first two seasons which were injury plagued and played while in his early 20s. But to expect Hughes to progress as a starter after a full year of success as a reliever, where he did not use all of his pitches and made up for location mistakes with increased velocity is unfair and unrealistic. He has 2 + pitches and a third that with proper use could have been elevated, but his development has been set back too far for that to be a variable in 2010. Another setback that Hughes will experience is one that is all too familiar to Yankees fans. Hughes will finish the year with somewhere around 90 innings pitched, which based on the Yanks’ handling of Joba Chamberlain this year, puts him in line for approximately 140 innings pitched next year. His starts will have to be modified (or Jobafied) at some point in 2010.

It is true that many starters would make great relievers for all of the reasons that Hughes has made a successful transition. But despite his youth and talent, Hughes may not be able to make the transition back. He may have been called Phil Franchise and he may have been the main reason the Yankees don’t have Johan Santana, but Hughes may not have the stuff to be more than a middling starter in the major leagues. While many would still place more value on the starter, having Hughes in the back end of the bullpen gives the Yankees value in stability. The parade of middle relievers and set up men through the Bronx has been never ending. And the performance of those types of players varies so much from year to year, a dominant 8^th inning pitcher year in and year out has more value than a starter like Oliver Perez and allows the Yankees not to spend a lot of money on lengthy contracts for the middle reliever du jour. (Such as Tom Gordon, Kyle Farnsworth, Steve Karsay, et al)

Hughes is also looked at by many as someone who is capable of being a successful set up reliever and possibly closer one day. A major league scout who requested anonymity said, “Phil Hughes…attacks the strike zone, he throws first pitch strikes, and he is efficient. Hughes appears to have “good face” (an old scouting term that refers to the look you see on a prospects face, his demeanor, how he handles failure and adversity, etc.); the perfect makeup to become a closer. I would see Hughes being able to bounce back the next day after giving up a walk off home run.” Those are qualities our scout does not believe Joba Chamberlain possesses. He says, “I don’t see Chamberlain, a fierce competitor who wears his heart on his sleeve, as having this same type of makeup (as Hughes).”

And there it is. Whenever there is a debate about a reliever turned starter (or vice versa) Joba Chamberlain’s name undoubtedly surfaces. While the Yankees did not do a great job with his progression this year, he still belongs in the starting rotation over the bullpen because he brings 4+ pitches to the table. While he has had trouble locating them this year, he has better stuff than Hughes and the ability to get outs with all four pitches. When Joba was a full time reliever he consistently threw 3-4 pitches, unlike Hughes who has dropped down to two. Now as a full time starter (well, kinda) Joba’s fastball percentages have pretty much stayed the same. The drop off has come in the amount of sliders he throws, which translates into slightly more changes and curves. Joba is far from a success story but his return to the rotation is due in large part to his superior stuff and expanded arsenal.

Phil Hughes may very well use this experience in the bullpen to harness his control, refine his pitches, and build his confidence. But his superior success in the 8^th inning and beyond is not just a result of a better than average starter dominating the late innings. It is consequence of a pitcher using his short time in the game to make up for his deficiencies by emphasizing his strengths and eliminating his weaknesses. If thrust back into the starting rotation Hughes will struggle because the approach of a reliever is more suited to make up, stuff, and abilities, and because his growth and progression has been stunted by injuries and use out of the bullpen.

Thanks to Fangraphs and Brooks Baseball for much of the data and stats used.

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