Foolish Contracts

Baseball is in an era where seemingly endless information is being used to make better decisions. New analysis techniques, both technical and traditional, are utilized in the hopes that teams minimize risk, miss less on player evaluation, and, most practically, put a winning club on the field. It is obvious that some teams use these methods; The Seattle Mariners have made a remarkable turnaround under General Manager Jack Zduriencik. Theo Epstein and company vaulted the Red Sox from perennial bridesmaid to a two-time champion and perennial contender. Perhaps the most dangerous situation is happening in New York as Brian Cashman has seized control from the faction in Tampa, Florida and has married modern analysis with boatloads of money. But, even with so much information out there, a number of teams continue to make the same mistakes every season; they pay too much money for middle relief or they over-commit to aging veterans in an effort to look proactive to an, oftentimes, disenfranchised fan base. Even in a poor economy, quite a few teams have made some curious signings this off-season. For Phillies’ fans, the unwise decision to give a three-year contract to Placido Polanco can be withstood because of the remainder of the roster and market size. But, for the Royals and Nationals, the offseason signings have been disastrous. Unfortunately for their fans, these mistakes are exactly the reason why there is little hope.

The Two-Year Commitment

In what is becoming somewhat of a trend this offseason, teams are extending two-year contracts to marginal (at best) players. While the money isn’t really the question for most teams, the idea of committing guaranteed money to players who do not guarantee anything in terms of positive production seems foolish. Large market teams like the Yankees, Red Sox, and Cubs can afford such mistakes. That is why the Cubs’ signing of middle reliever John Grabow to two year, $7.25 million dollar deal is a little less worrisome than the Nationals giving two years to Ivan Rodriguez or the Royals giving two years to Jason Kendall. The Cubs have the financial resources to withstand a poor second year of production (or even the first year). The small market teams do not. If a large market team makes too many of these mistakes—the Cubs are right there, as are division mates, the Houston Astros—they quickly become a team of old players with bloated contracts.

When the Washington Nationals gave Ivan Rodriguez a two year, $6 million dollar contract, many wondered if the old regime was still in charge as the move reeked of signing a big name to sell tickets. Rodriguez is, indeed, a name; he is a viable candidate for the Hall of Fame when he finally retires. From 1996 through 2004, he hit .318/.360/.522 with 301 doubles, 25 triples, 201 homeruns, 746 RBI, and 83 stolen bases. In short, he was simply an elite level hitter who happened to be a very good defensive catcher. But, since 2004, Rodriguez has, predictably, wilted due age. Since the beginning of the 2005 season, Rodriguez has hit .278/.304/.418 with just 135 doubles, 17 triples, and 55 homeruns. In three of the last five seasons, he has posted an on base percentage under .300. With his defensive skills eroding and his reputation of still wanting to be a full-time starter, why would any team give him a two-year contract. Yes, three million dollars per season is not significant money. But, the Nationals are not going to contend for several seasons and Rodriguez won’t be sought after in a trade during the deadline with a guaranteed 2011 season. The Nationals don’t play in a small market, but they surely act like it. Signing Rodriguez doesn’t make them a better team, especially when considering that the 2009 catching tandem of Josh Bard and Wil Nieves produced similar offensive numbers. If Jesus Flores can comeback healthy from shoulder surgery, he is clearly a better offensive option, at a significantly less cost. If Flores is going to be the starter, $6 million dollars on a backup catcher seems quite expensive considering the payroll and the needs of the Nationals. Indeed, the move seems to have been made for reasons other than baseball.

The Kansas City Royals are infamous for making moves such as the one they made last week. Jose Guillen and Kyle Farnsworth are just two reminders of the litany of poor signings made to appease the fan base and without prudent judgment. This time, the Royals inked 36-year-old catcher Jason Kendall to a two-year, $6 million dollar contract. Unlike the Nationals, the Royals are guaranteeing Kendall the starting job as they have parted ways with 2009 catchers Miguel Olivo and John Buck. Like Rodriguez, Kendall was once an above average hitter. From 1998 through 2003, Kendall hit .306/.386/.422 with 165 doubles, 20 triples, 53 homeruns, 329 RBI, and 106 stolen bases. He was never a power hitter, but he posted on base percentages over .400 in three consecutive seasons (98-2000). But, as predicted, Kendall has declined both offensive and defensively. Since 2007, he is a .242/.320/.313 hitter 69 doubles, 5 triples, and just 7 homeruns. Even more important, he has become one of the easiest catchers in the game to steal a base against. He has thrown out 20 percent (and less) of base runners in three of the last five seasons.

Questionable Intentions

For the Nationals, the intentions seem fairly obvious. The franchise in need of some attention grabbed a future Hall of Famer in the hopes that he plays well in limited opportunities. They will sell the idea that Rodriguez is a mature veteran who will work well with the Nationals’ promising young starters. Is that really reality? Rodriguez has never had the reputation of working well with pitchers, especially in the area of calling pitches. He has long been criticized for calling more fastballs with runners on base in an effort to have a better chance at throwing out a would-be base stealer. Many have questioned his participation in pregame meetings. Perhaps age and the realization of the end of a brilliant career will change him. But, if everything broke right for the Nationals this season, the best-case scenario is a .500 season. Rodriguez accepted a part-time role last season once he was traded to Texas; they were in contention for a playoff berth. Can the proud Rodriguez accept a part-time role on a 68-win team who may trade Adam Dunn by the deadline? It doesn’t seem likely, which makes the second year of the deal so terrible. While signing Rodriguez doesn’t do much for the improvement of the team, a one-year contract would’ve been more understandable. If he didn’t work out,  he could be traded or even released. Now, Mike Rizzo, the General Manager of the Nationals, has saddled the organization with a two-season commitment. For a team relying on young pitching and young players, the move is an effort to gain fan support.

Dayton Moore’s intentions are a bit murkier. Moore has often been criticized for his seeming disdain for on base percentage. Under his regime, the Royals have been one of the worst teams in terms of getting on base. Last season, the Royals’ catchers, Miguel Olivo, John Buck, and Bryan Pena, had OBP’s of .292, .299, and .318 respectively. Kendall’s .329 OBP over the past two seasons seems to be a great boost to the club. Is Moore’s intention to boost the OBP of his club to sign an aging catcher who is marginally better at getting on base (thanks in part to 30 hit by pitches)? Is he really trying to sell the fan base on that idea? He is certainly not getting an elite level defender to makeup for the fact that his three catchers had OPS+ of 103, 103, and 100 respectively. While those aren’t elite statistics, Kendall hasn’t had an OPS+ over 90 since 2004; he has posted an OPS+ of 74 and 72 over the past two seasons. The Royals finished 13^th out of 14 teams in the American League with 144 homeruns. By adding Kendall as the starter (and saying goodbye to Buck and Olivo), they have subtracted 31 homeruns from that total. Once again, the Royals go about things in an odd way. Yes, they needed to increase their on base percentage. Instead of taking the $6 million and upgrading an outfield position or shortstop, the Royals marginally upgrade the problem at catcher while subtracting the little power asset present. The intentions may have been good, but the execution shows a lack of understanding of the true problem.

Weak Market, but…

An argument for signing both players could be made on the quality of the catching market. The options are scarce for sure. Brian Schneider received a two-year contract from the Phillies (another terrible financial commitment from the Phillies). Bengie Molina is the premier catcher on the market. Names like Yorvit Torrealba and Rod Barajas are discussed. Signing Rodriguez and Kendall isn’t that terrible until factoring in the second season. Why commit? Were other teams really competing hard for either catcher? Were teams really battling and willing to give a two-year commitment? The answer is most likely no as signs point to both teams having interest from the onset. First, both are one of the first 10 free agents signed. Last season, Rodriguez waited to the start of spring training before getting a one-year contract from the Astros. Teams weren’t lining up this offseason either. Kendall gave indication that the Royals called him on the first day of free agency and were aggressive until the deal was struck. In the end, scarcity doesn’t seem to play a big role. These were players targeted by each team. That speaks volumes.

Closing Thoughts

Fans do like to see their teams being active during the offseason. It is always good to your team trying to improve. However, fans are not stupid. Fans know when a team is merely making moves just for the sake of looking busy. Nationals’ fans understand that bringing in Rodriguez isn’t really about improvement. Royals’ fans are suffering from yet another poor decision from the organization. Even more troubling is the fact that the Royals are the epitome of the small market team. With a payroll that has hovered between $36 and $70 million dollars for the past five seasons, committing $3 million dollars is significant. Committing it to a player who is long past his prime and really doesn’t bring much in terms of value and actually hurts an already limited offense, is quite foolish. Moves like these take away trust, the fans’ greatest asset. Without trust, there is no hope; without hope, the fans have nothing. One would think that teams would better utilize all of the data available. In 2009/2010, teams should not be making these types of decisions. General Managers should be held to higher standard because of the availability of information. They shouldn’t miss as much. So far, it appears that Rizzo and Moore (we haven’t even touched the Astros’ terrible decisions) have both missed. Is it any wonder why these teams reside in the basement every season? Yes, they are at a disadvantage economically; there is no debate. But, unwisely spending limited resources is worse. Foolish spending is why these teams don’t ever compete.

Surely the question is raised, “whom else are they going to sign?” The answer is simple: nobody. If there isn’t a significant upgrade that will actually help the organization grow, teams should spend the money on scouting, player development, and enhancing their statistical analysis department. Wise teams don’t just sign players for the sake of signing players. For the Nationals, a one year commitment to Rodriguez or any other backup catcher would have been just fine. For the Royals, bringing back one of their two departing free agents might have been a better choice. Both teams would’ve saved money and wouldn’t have had 2011 issues. Most assuredly, this will come back to hurt both organizations.

Popularity: 1% [?]